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We exploit a large and long longitudinal dataset to estimate the immigrant-native earnings gap at entry and over 
time for the UK between 1978 and 2006. That is, we attempt to separately estimate cohort and assimilation 
effects.  We  also  estimate  the  associated  immigrant  earnings  growth  rate  and  immigrant-native  earnings 
convergence rate. Our estimates suggest that immigrants from more recent cohorts fare better than earlier ones at 
entry. Furthermore, the earnings of immigrants from more recent cohorts catch up faster with natives' earnings. 
While the convergence took over 30 years for those entering in the post-war, it only took half as long for those 
entering in the early 2000s. This earnings growth is fastest in the first 10 years, and it considerably slows down 
after 30 years.  
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1. Introduction 
Much of the international immigration literature over the last 30 years is concerned with 
the labour market adjustment of immigrants in the host country. In particular, the literature 
has focused on estimating the immigrant-native earnings gap at entry and over time, as well as 
the associated immigrant earnings growth rate and the immigrant-native earnings convergence 
rate, which is sometimes referred to as immigrant (earnings) assimilation. 
The early cross-section studies in this literature found that immigrants' earnings were lower 
than the earnings of comparable natives at entry. However, as immigrants' earnings increased 
at a faster rate – fastest in the first few years after immigration – the initial immigrant-native 
earnings gap closed over time. This earnings convergence, it was argued, derived from the 
fact that immigrants were more able, more motivated or more hardworking than natives.    
Early enough, though, an intense debate in the literature about the interpretation of these 
findings sparkled. The main criticism was that, instead of providing a measure of earnings 
assimilation,  the  cross-section  evidence  was  actually  capturing  changes  over  time  in 
unmeasured dimensions of immigrants' skills, such as a decline in the relative skills of more 
recent cohorts (Chiswick 1980; Borjas 1985). In that case, the cross-section evidence had little 
to say about immigrant-native earnings convergence. Other such selection arguments included 
return migration of immigrants that are less able and other types of data attrition. 
Biases implied by these various types of selectivity in the data, such as cohort bias and 
survivor bias, became a central identification issue in the literature (Chiswick 1978 and 1980; 
Carliner 1980; Borjas 1985, 1994 and 1999; Duleep and Regets 1997; Chiswick et al. 2005). 
This  literature  soon  recognized  that  identification  of  assimilation  effects  separately  from 
cohort effects required a sufficiently large and long longitudinal dataset that tracked particular 
workers over time – a very scarce kind of dataset.    
The main contribution of this paper is to exploit one such a dataset to estimate assimilation 
effects  separately  from  cohort  effects.  We  use  the  UK  Lifetime  Labour  Market  Database 
(LLMDB),  which  is  a  large  and  long  longitudinal  dataset  –  yet  largely  unused  in  the 
immigration  literature  –  that  combines  anonymised  administrative  tax  records  and  social 
security records into a dataset that tracks a random sample of 647,000 individuals between 
1978 and 2006. The LLMDB not only tracks workers over their working lives, but also has 
high levels of accuracy and relatively low levels of attrition. Given that the availability of 
longitudinal data has been so limited, this paper is an important contribution to the literature.  
Furthermore, this paper is an important contribution to the rather limited UK immigration 2 
 
literature, where assimilation and cohort effects estimates are largely unavailable.
2 This is in 
contrast  with  the  international  literature,  where  considerable  effort  has  been  put  into 
estimating such effects. In his pioneering paper, Chiswick (1980) alerted for such scarcity in 
the UK literature. Nevertheless, 30 years on and less than a handful of papers have followed 
(Bell 1997; Dustmann and Fabbri 2005; Dickens and McKnight 2008). Therefore, this paper 
is an important contribution as it helps to fill this blank in the UK literature and it helps to 
inform policymaking in the face of continuing public debate on immigration policy in the UK. 
We initially utilize our longitudinal data as a succession of independent cross-sections to 
estimate a simple descriptive earnings model. We then re-estimate our simple model using a 
restricted sample of immigrants who stayed in the UK for 30 years or longer to account for 
survivor  bias.  Finally,  we  exploit  the  longitudinal  nature  of  our  data  to  estimate  a  more 
complete earnings model in an attempt to disentangle cohort and assimilation effects. Our 
approach confirms that cross-section data estimates are biased and a comparison of these with 
longitudinal data estimates gives an indication of the extent of this bias.  
Our  longitudinal  data  estimates  suggest  that  immigrants  from  more  recent  cohorts  fare 
better than earlier ones at entry. For example, whereas immigrants that arrived in the post-war 
period earned nearly 60% less than comparable natives at entry, those arriving in the early 
2000s earned only 30% less at entry. Furthermore, our estimates suggest that the earnings of 
immigrants  from  more  recent  cohorts  catch  up  faster  with  natives'  earnings.  While  the 
convergence took over 30 years for those entering in the post-war, it only took half as long for 
those entering in the early 2000s. The earnings of immigrants increase 33% faster than the 
earnings of natives in the first 10 years after arrival. This earnings convergence is fastest in 
the first 10 years, and it considerably slows down after 30 years.  
 We thoroughly discuss the above issues in the remainder of this paper. In Section 2 we 
depict our data. In Section 3 and 4 we specify our empirical models and carefully discuss 
several identification issues. In Section 5 we summarize the results. In Section 6 we discuss 
our results before we conclude in Section 7. 
                                            
2 Although the corresponding literature is quite large for the US (Chiswick 1978; Borjas 1985, 1995 and 1999; 
Butcher and DiNardo 2002; Cortes 2004; Chiswick et al. 2005; etc.), it is limited for the UK. Using data from 
the 1972 General Household Survey (GHS) to estimate a standard human capital earnings model, Chiswick 
(1980) found no earnings gap for white but a -25% gap for non-white male immigrants. In an attempt to model 
cohort and assimilation effects separately, Bell (1997) used 1973-1992 GHS data and broadly confirmed these 
earlier findings. Dustmann and Fabbri (2005) estimated a simple model using data from the 1979-2004 Labour 
Force Survey (LFS) and expanded the analysis to include females. They found that the wage gap for non-white 
immigrants was as large as -40%, though this varied with immigrants' region of origin. Dickens and McKnight 
(2008)  estimated  an  unrefined  model  using  data  from  the  1978-2003  Lifetime  Labour  Market  Database 
(LLMDB) and found surprisingly large and negative wage gaps for all immigrants. In particular, they found a 
large wage penalty for white (European) immigrants, which is not in line with the UK or international literature.  3 
 
2. Data   
We  use  data  from  the  Lifetime  Labour  Market  Database  (LLMDB).  The  LLMDB  is 
derived from several administrative datasets linked together by a unique individual identifier, 
the national insurance number (NINo). Individuals must apply for a NINo in order to pay tax 
(income tax, national insurance contributions, self-employment contributions, etc.), receive 
retirement pension, or claim social security benefits (e.g. unemployment benefit, incapacity 
benefit,  sickness  benefit,  maternity  benefit,  child  benefit,  housing  benefit,  etc.).  Whereas 
natives are automatically given a NINo just before they turn 16 years of age, which is derived 
from  their  child  benefit  number,  immigrants  typically  apply  for  a  NINo  when  they  start 
interacting with the system, either by paying taxes or by claiming benefits. ("Natives" and 
"Immigrants"  here  and  throughout  the  paper  are  respectively  UK  born  and  overseas  born 
nationals.)  Because  individuals  need  to  produce  their  NINo  in  every  interaction  with  the 
system,  the  LLMDB  effectively  tracks  individuals  throughout  their  lifetime  –  and  more 
crucially, throughout their working lives.  
The  main  advantage  of  the  LLMDB,  therefore,  is  that  it  is  a  rich,  long  and  large 
longitudinal  dataset.  It  has  high  levels  of  accuracy  and  relatively  low  levels  of  attrition 
(individuals only drop out of the sample if they neither pay taxes nor claim any benefit nor 
receive retirement pension for more than 12 months; they re-enter the sample when they again 
interact with the system). Our LLMDB sample comprises 647,068 individuals (a 1% random 
sample of NINo records) followed between the tax-years 1978 and 2006 (which run from 
April to March) resulting in 11,061,433 observations (a fresh cohort of individuals enters the 
data every year and is followed from then on). We restricted our sample to those aged 25 to 
64, as is common in the immigration assimilation literature (though the results were robust 
when including those aged 16 to 64). We also restricted our sample to those earning between 
£100 and £1000000 in any one tax-year (this excludes the self-employed, for whom we do not 
observe earnings). We also restricted our sample to immigrants arriving from 1945 onwards, 
because the number of immigrants arriving previously was relatively very low and because 
restricting the sample facilitates cohort modelling, which we discuss in Sections 3 and 4. 
Finally, we restricted our sample to those observed at least twice (though our results were 
robust  to  including  individuals  observed  only  once).  Our  final  working  sample  therefore 
consists of 433,069 individuals, 45,309 of whom are immigrants, as shown in Table 1. The 
total number of observations is 5,373,086 and the average number of observations for natives 
(immigrants)  is  15.76  (18.71).  Figure  1  shows  the  distribution  of  natives  and  immigrants 4 
 
across tax-years.  
The LLMDB contains well over 400 variables, including date of birth, date of death, age, 
gender, address, nationality, country which immigrants arrived from, immigrants' entry date,
3 
immigrants'  age  at  entry,  number  of  jobs  in  the  year,  annual  earnings  per  job,  type  of 
employment (employee or self-employed), number of weeks employed (unemployed) in the 
year, dates of spells of unemployment, dates of spells of receipt of benefits, benefit type, 
pension contributions, pension entitlements, etc. As is common with administrative data, the 
LLMDB does not contain information on education. In this paper we circumvent this issue to 
some extent by restricting our sample to those in work aged 25 to 64, who, we assume, have 
completed their  education.
4  In addition, the  LLMDB does not contain  information on the 
immigrants'  entry  route  (work  permit,  student  visa,  family  reunification,  etc.)  or  on  their 
departure date. Since in this paper we focus on those already in work, their entry route is not 
crucial, though some limited information on such a route can be gauged from their first few 
interactions with the system. Similarly, since we are focusing on those in work, differentiating 
whether an immigrant left the labour force or left the country is not crucial here, although it 
might be very relevant elsewhere. 
Table 1 shows that natives are older than immigrants, are more evenly spread across the 
country, are more likely to be employed and slightly less likely to be unemployed, and earn 
more on average. Immigrants at the very bottom of the earnings distribution earn less whereas 
those at the very top earn more than natives. Table 1 also shows that immigrants arrive young 
and  many  remain  for  several  years.  Immigrants  predominantly  come  from  the  European 
Union (EU), Asia and the Middle East, and Africa, and there are marginally proportionately 
more white than non-white immigrants. Figure 2 confirms that these overall patterns persist 
across tax-years, though the proportion of non-whites increases over time. Interestingly, Table 
1  shows  that  immigration  intensified  after  the  mid  1970s.
5  Figure  3  plots  the  inflow  of 
                                            
3 The entry date is only recorded when the immigrant applies for a NINo, which depends on her individual 
circumstances and might not happen immediately upon arrival. Existing internal checks in the data and our own 
analysis suggest that the associated measurement error is fairly limited, especially after 1997.  
4 Although earnings models commonly control for education, there is an unresolved debate in the immigration 
literature  about  what  the  interpretation  of  other  coefficients  in  the  model  should  be  when  controlling  for 
education (Borjas 1999). Excluding education implies that we are comparing the earnings of immigrants and 
natives, and not the earnings of immigrants and natives with the same education level. This is important because 
the extent and quality of education varies across countries. Therefore, immigrants and natives with the same 
education may have different skills and compete for different jobs. Furthermore, immigrants across the education 
spectrum often suffer skill downgrading due to language or other labour market barriers.  
5 Although our sample period is between 1978 and 2006, the last cohort is four years short, by construction, 
since all those arriving in 2006 were dropped from the sample because they were only observed once. 5 
 
immigrants by year of arrival and continent of nationality.
6 Most cohorts display a mix of 
white  and  non-white  immigrants.  For  example,  during  the  1950s  and  1960s,  white  EU 
immigrants (mainly Irish) and non-white immigrants from former colonies (India, Pakistan, 
Bangladeshi,  South  Africa,  Nigeria,  etc.)  came  to  the  UK  to  help  with  the  post-war 
reconstruction effort. There were also other minority groups, such as Jews fleeing to the UK 
and refugees from Kenya, Uganda, etc. During the 1970s this overall trend continued, with 
increased EU immigration, especially after 1973, when the UK joined the EU. In this period 
there was also an increased inflow of immigrants from India (mainly because Gujarati Indians 
were expelled from Uganda) and from Vietnam and South East Asia. During the 1980s and 
1990s white immigration increased proportionately more, following the enlargement of the 
EU  when  Greece  (in  1981)  and  Portugal  and  Spain  (in  1986)  joined  in,  and  following 
increases in the inflow of immigrants from North America, Australasia and Oceania. In that 
period non-white immigration, mainly from Africa, Asia and the Middle East, also increased. 
In the late 1990s and 2000s white immigration from the EU, North America, Australasia and 
Oceania  continued  to  increase  strongly,  more  dramatically  after  2004,  when  ten  Eastern 
European countries (A10) joined a further enlarged EU.
7 In this period non-white immigration 
from Africa, Asia and the Middle East increased sharply, and immigration from Central and 
South America also became more pronounced.  
The above figures illustrate that disaggregation by continent of nationality and by cohort of 
arrival is another main advantage of the LLMDB. The LLMDB also permits disaggregation 
by small geographical levels.
8 This is in contrast with the more widely used Labour Force 
Survey (LFS) – which is a rotating panel survey that interviews around 60,000 households 
with  about  140,000  respondents  every  quarter  available  since  1992  (more  comprehensive 
wages and hours worked data is available after 1997) – where immigration analysis across 
years and continents or below the regional level is not feasible due to sample size limitations. 
                                            
6 Although the LLMDB is more reliable after 1975, and more reliable still after 1997, Figure 3 plots the inflow 
from 1945 onwards. The overall number of immigrants is fairly reliable, but their continent of nationality was 
not always imputed. The rather large spikes in the series of "unknown" continent of nationality in Figure 3 
reflects  the introduction of new computing  systems  when inputting  fields such as country of  nationality of 
immigrants was not a priority. For example, the spike in 1975 reflects immigrants that arrived in the immediately 
preceding years (that is also true for the spikes in 1948 and 1997). Luckily, this affects only three of our 13 
cohorts  of  interest.  Thus,  despite  this  caveat  in  the  data,  it  is  possible  to  identify  some  overall  patterns  of 
immigration.  
7 Although the EU was successively enlarged at various points during our sample period, for consistency our 
definition of countries belonging to the EU throughout the whole period is that of 2006. We separately define the 
A10 countries, which are: Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovenia and Slovakia, 
Malta and Cyprus. 
8  The  ONS-defined  geographical  areas  we  use  are:  409  Local  Authority  Districts,  49  counties  and  12 
Government Regions (ONS 2003) (see Table 1). 6 
 
Table 1 shows LFS variables. Dustmann and Fabbri (2005), using LFS data for a roughly 
comparable  sample  period,  report  descriptive  statistics  that  are  in  line  with  our  own 
descriptives here. 
Table 1 shows that both the LLMDB and the LFS exhibit broadly similar patterns (we use 
the 1997-2007 sample period for this comparison). Women are slightly underrepresented in 
the  LLMDB,  perhaps  reflecting  their  labour  market  participation  decisions.  The  age 
distribution in both datasets is remarkably similar for natives, though a larger proportion of 
immigrants is younger in the LLMDB (note that we tabulate observations, not individuals). 
This is because a larger share of observations in the LLMDB is for immigrants (8.2% versus 
7.7%) – and because the LLMDB better captures low paid immigrant workers, who tend to be 
younger.  For  example,  the  LLMDB  might  capture  working  foreign  students  and  working 
illegal  immigrants  who  might  not  have  been  captured  in  the  LFS.
9  As  a  result,  average 
earnings are lower in the LLMDB. 
Importantly, the LLMDB records annual earnings (within the tax-year) – i.e. total annual 
earnings  including  any  part-time  and/or  unemployment  spells  –  whereas  the  LFS  records 
weekly earnings in a given week, which are extrapolated for the year ignoring any part-time 
and/or unemployment spells (which are unknown). As a result, the LFS figures in Table 1 
overestimate earnings, which are higher for every percentile of the distribution. The difference 
is larger at the bottom and smaller at the top of the distribution, confirming that the LLMDB 
captures  more  low  paid  workers  (who  either  earn  lower  wages  or  work  fewer  hours).  In 
particular, the LFS figures overestimate earnings for immigrants, who are more likely to be 
low paid, and thus the gap between natives and immigrants is less (more) persistent in the LFS 
(LLMDB), with immigrants earning more than natives up to the 20
th (60
th) percentile of the 
distribution. However, although earnings are consistently lower in the LLMDB, the average 
earnings trend over time is similar. (Detailed comparisons across years, available on request, 
depict  a  very  similar  pattern  of  average  earnings,  percentile  earnings,  employment  and 
unemployment rates across both datasets.) Dickens and McKnight (2008) carried out a similar 
analysis comparing the LLMDB and the ASHE and also concluded that annual earnings are 
lower in the LLMDB but that the trend of average earnings, and of selected percentiles of the 
earnings distribution, across both datasets is similar over time. 
                                            
9 A small number of workers who earn too little or work too few hours to incur a national insurance contribution 
liability,  for  example  those  working  part-time  for  very  small  employers,  are  not  included  in  the  LLMDB. 
Medium and larger employers are captured and their non-liable employees are included in the LLMDB. The LFS 
includes earnings for the self-employed, which are not recorded in the LLMDB (see above). 7 
 
Finally, Table 1 shows that the regional distribution both in the LLMDB and in the LFS is 
remarkably  similar  for  natives  –  and  for  immigrants,  if  those  with  unknown  or  abroad 
locations are excluded from the analysis. The distribution of immigrants' country of origin is 
also very similar in both datasets – again if those from unknown origin are excluded from the 
analysis. The distribution of immigrants' cohort of arrival is also very similar in both datasets 
(for a discussion of the spike at the 1975-1979 cohort in the LLMDB, see Footnote 5). 
 
3. Cross-Section versus Longitudinal Analysis  
We exploit the large sample size of the LLMDB to estimate a descriptive model of the 
immigrant-native earnings gap for each tax-year between 1978 and 2006, treating the data as a 
succession of 29 cross-sections: 
* * *
i i i I E ε β α + + =                           (1) 
where  i E  is log real earnings of individual  i;  i I  is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the 
individual is an immigrant; and 
*
i ε  is the error term. The interpretation of our coefficient of 
interest is that immigrants on average earn  %
* β  more than natives – that is the immigrant-
earnings gap is  %
* β .
10 We use generalized least square estimation and report robust White-
corrected errors. 
In each tax-year, we estimate this model for immigrants that are entering that tax-year; we 
then re-estimate the model controlling for the number of employed weeks in the tax-year. We 
also estimate the model for immigrants after 1 year of arrival, as well as after 10, 20 and 30 
years of arrival, as shown in Figure 4 (and its counterpart Table A1).  
At entry, Figure 4 suggests that immigrants earn roughly between 10% and 70% less than 
natives. After 10 years, this gap narrows to around zero for those arriving after the 1980s, with 
more  recent  cohorts  doing  better.  This  suggests  that  immigrants'  earnings  catch  up  with 
natives'  earnings  after  10  years.  After  20  years,  Figure  4  suggests  that  immigrants  earn 
roughly between 0% and 30% more than natives. After 30  years, the gap is positive and 
larger,  though  variation  year-on-year  is  large,  reflecting  the  smaller  sample  sizes  and  the 
different mix of immigrants arriving in each cohort (see Section 2). For example, the saw-
                                            
10 More precisely, immigrants on average earn  ] 1 ) [exp( 100
* * − = β b  more than natives. The closer  * β  is to zero, 
the better it approximates 
* b . Although some of our estimates are closer to zero than others, for simplicity we 
report  * β  (and respectively  β  in Section 4) throughout the paper. Strictly speaking, immigrants on average earn 
β  more than natives in logarithmic units (Halvorsen and Palmquist 1980). 8 
 
toothed pattern in the mid and late 1990s might reflect the larger numbers of refugees from 
India, Kenya and Uganda in the mid and late 1960s. The sudden drop just before 2005 is, 
however, related to the new 1975 computing system (see Footnote 6); the same is true for the 
drop just before 1995 in the "After 20 years" series and the drop after 1997 in the "At Entry" 
series (see Section 2). Therefore the analysis for the 1965-1975 and 1997-1998 cohorts is best 
avoided as it can be misleading. 
Another way to look at these results is to follow a particular immigrant cohort over time. 
For  example,  the  immigrant-native  earnings  gap  for  immigrants  that  arrived  in  1978  is             
-45.9%  at  entry,  4.4%  after  10  years  and  14%  after  20  years  of  arrival  (see  Table  A1); 
whereas the gap for those that arrived in 1977 is 12% after 10 years, 15.6% after 20 years and 
21.7%  after  30  years.  Most  coefficients  are  statistically  significantly  different  from  zero, 
although for earlier cohorts the coefficients are sometimes not significant.  
However,  these  estimates  might  be  biased.  For  example,  if  changes  over  time  in 
unmeasured dimensions of immigrants' skills occurred during our sample period or if return 
migration of immigrants that are less able (along with other types of data attrition) occurred, 
then our estimates might be biased. Concerns with bias implied by various types of selectivity 
in the data, such as cohort bias and survivor bias, have occupied much of the literature for the 
last 30 years (Chiswick 1978, 1980; Carliner 1980; Borjas 1985, 1994 and 1999; Duleep and 
Regets 1997; Chiswick et al. 2005). This literature has long recognized that the ideal way to 
address such selectivity biases is to use sufficiently large and long longitudinal data – which 
has, however, been very scarce. Therefore, using the LLMDB to track immigrants over time 
when  estimating  the  immigrant-natives  earnings  gap  is  a  timely  contribution,  as  it  helps 
prevent cohort bias and survivor bias. This is specially so because data attrition other than 
return migration in the LLMDB is fairly limited (see Section 2).  
We thus re-estimate Equation (1) for a restricted sample of immigrants who stayed in the 
UK for 30 years or longer, as we show in Figure 5 (and its counterpart Table A2). The pattern 
of  the  immigrant-native  earnings  gap  estimates  is  fairly  similar  to  before,  although  the 
magnitude of the gap is consistently larger when using the sample of tracked immigrants. 
Since  other  sources  of  data  attrition  are  not  much  of  a  concern  in  our  data,  the  obvious 
explanation here is return migration of the less able. The selectivity argument that more able, 
more motivated or more hardworking immigrants stayed on and were assimilated is in line 
with the larger more positive gap for the tracked sample. In other words, this suggests that the 
cross-section estimates in Figure 4 are downwards biased estimates of the immigrant-native 9 
 
earnings gap, and the estimates in Figure 5 give an indication of the extent of such survivor 
bias. For example, the gap after 20 years for immigrants that arrived in 1977 is now 26.1%, 
instead of 15.6% (see Tables A1 and A2). 
When following particular tracked immigrant cohorts over time, there is still great year-on-
year variation. This suggests the presence of cohort bias to some extent in our estimates, 
perhaps  reflecting  changes  over  time  in  unmeasured  dimensions  of  immigrants'  skills, 
probably associated, at least in part, with the different mix of immigrants arriving in each 
cohort. However, in our cross-section analysis here, we do not control for other individual 
characteristics  (other  than  the  number  of  weeks  employed  in  the  year)  that  could  proxy 
immigrants' skills; neither do we control for area or tax-year fixed effects. Thus, we now turn 
our attention to investigating whether such factors have an effect on our immigrant-native 
earnings gap estimates. 
 
4. Economic Assimilation 
Our estimates in Section 3 suggest the existence of an immigrant-native earnings gap in the 
UK between 1978 and 2006, which is quite sizeable for some groups of immigrants. However, 
such unconditional earnings gap estimates need to be proved robust when accounting for the 
effect of other individual characteristics (such as gender, age, continent of nationality, years 
since immigration, etc.) on earnings. We now account for this by estimating a conditional 
immigrant-native earnings gap model (conditional on such individual characteristics). Those 
unconditional estimates also need to be proved robust to when the specific effect of areas and 
tax-years on earnings is accounted for. We now account for this by exploiting the longitudinal 
dimension of our data. This way we can disentangle cohort and assimilation effects. 
We use what is now a standard immigrant economic (earnings) assimilation model in the 
literature (Chiswick 1980; Borjas 1999): 
iat t a iat i
I
iat iat i iat f f X I X Z I E ε λ λ γ β α + + + + + + + =                (2) 
where  iat E   is  log  real  earnings  of  individual  433069 ,..., 1 = i   in  area  49 ,..., 1 = a   and  time 
2006 ,..., 1978 = t ;  i I  is as before an indicator variable that equals 1 if the individual is an 
immigrant;  iat Z  is the number of "years since immigration" for immigrants and is zero for 
natives;  iat X  is a vector of observable individual characteristics;  a f  is area fixed effects;  t f  is 
time fixed effects; and  iat ε  is the error term.  10 
 
The interpretation of our first coefficient of interest is that immigrants on average earn  % β  
more than natives at entry – that is the immigrant-native earnings gap at entry is  % β  – when 
compared  with  natives  with  similar  individual  characteristics  (see  Footnote  10).  The 
interpretation of our second coefficient of interest is that each year spent in the UK on average 
increases  the  earnings  of  immigrants  by  % γ .  We  can  also  use  the  model's  estimates  to 
calculate the earnings gap after arrival, as well as the immigrant earnings growth rate and the 
rate of earnings convergence between immigrants and natives.
11 
We model area fixed effects using county dummies (see Section 2). This way we remove 
any permanent differences across counties and make them equally attractive. In other words, 
we control for specific factors in a county (such as more schools, more housing, lower prices, 
etc.) that may make it more attractive to immigrants or natives or both. This enables us to 
separately account for the effect of county specific time invariant factors on earnings. We 
model time fixed effects using tax-year dummies (see Section 2). This way we control for the 
effect  of  tax-year  specific  macroeconomic  effects  (such  as  seasonal  shocks,  national  and 
international macroeconomic shocks, etc.). This enables us to separately account for the effect 
of tax-year specific factors on earnings. Controlling for area and time fixed effects in this 
flexible manner (across counties and tax-years) is an improvement to the existing UK earnings 
gap literature.
12  
We also control for observable individual characteristics such as sex, age, age squared, 
number of employed weeks in the year and number of jobs in the year (see Table 1). We allow 
the effect of these variables to differ between natives and immigrants. This enables us to 
separately account for the effect of such characteristics on the earnings of each group. For 
example, this way we account for  earnings differentials due to workers being  younger in 
addition to being immigrants. Although we do not observe experience, we control for age, 
                                            
11 The immigrant earnings growth rate is  γ  times the number of years since arrival; whereas the immigrant-
native  earnings  convergence  rate  is  the  immigrant  earnings  growth  added  to  the  difference  between  the 
coefficient of age, times the number of years after arrival, for immigrant and natives (Borjas 1999). The earnings 
gap after arrival is the immigrant earnings  growth added to  β  and 
I λ  (the coefficients of the  number of 
employed weeks in the year and the number of jobs in the year are timed by their respective averages in the 
immigrant sample from Table 1). 
12 The available models in this literature do not control for area fixed effects, except for Dustman and Fabbri 
(2005), who include region (not county) fixed effects. Here we model area fixed effects using 49 counties instead 
of 12 regions, which is a more flexible approach. On a related point, the assumption that area and time fixed 
effects  are  the  same  for  immigrants  and  natives  is  restrictive,  since  macroeconomic  conditions  most  likely 
affected both groups differently. This is particularly so if immigrants are concentrated in the low or high end of 
the earnings distribution, as suggested by Table 1 (see Section 2); or if the earnings distribution changed over 
time (LaLonde and Topel 1992; Butcher and  DiNardo 2002). However, this is a common restriction in the 
literature (Borjas 1999).  11 
 
which, albeit imperfectly, captures overall experience to a certain extent (Borjas 1999). In 
addition, we control for "years since immigration" and its squared value to account for the 
effect of extra time spent in the UK on earnings. Since "years since immigration" is often 
identical to experience in the UK, as most immigrants arrived as adult workers, this enables us 
to gauge the weight that employers attach to experience gained in the UK.
13 
We use generalized least square estimation and correct for intragroup serial correlation, as 
standard errors are assumed to be independent across groups of individuals but not within 




The first column in Table 2 (and of its counterpart Table A3) shows a significant -0.462 
estimate  of  β .  This  estimate  suggests  that  immigrants  on  average  earn  46.2%  less  than 
comparable natives at entry. This is fairly close to our cross-section estimates for cohorts 
entering in the 1980s and 1990s in Section 3, though larger than for those cohorts entering in 
the early 2000s. This suggests that the earnings gap at entry is relatively robust to controlling 
for other individual characteristics and area and time fixed effects. 
This immigrant-native earnings gap at entry narrows to -0.281 after 10 years, -0.042 after 
20  years  and 0.104  after 30  years. This suggests that immigrants' earnings  catch up  with 
natives' earnings a little after 20 years, which is more than 10 years later than our cross-
section estimates suggested in Section 3. This indicates that other individual characteristics 
and area and time fixed effects play a role in determining the immigrant-native earnings gap 
after entry.  
 
5.1  Cohort Effects 
Our  immigrant-native  earnings  gap  estimates  in  Section  5  pool  together  very  diverse 
groups  of  immigrants  who  differ  widely  in  several  individual  characteristics.  One  such 
                                            
13 We experimented with controlling for "age at entry" – which captures the human capital endowment at arrival 
and is particularly important for identifying immigrants who arrived as children and thus have labour market 
characteristics of natives – instead of age and age squared (due to collinearity with "years since immigration"), 
but this did not alter our main results (also see Borjas 1994 and 1999). In our data sample, most immigrants 
arrived as adults; around 10% entered as children, and the vast majority of these arrived before 1969 from ex-
colonies and from Europe. Our results were also robust to including extra controls such as receipt of maternity 
benefit, child benefit,  incapacity benefit,  sickness benefit, etc. Most of these,  however, are not consistently 
available for the entire sample period, since they were introduced or changed at various points in time. 12 
 
important characteristic is their cohort of arrival. If all cohorts displayed a similar mix of 
immigrants in terms of continent of nationality, English proficiency, skills, motivation, work 
ethics, etc., and if the economic conditions in the UK were the same throughout the whole 
sample period (along with natives' attitudes to migration), then there would be no reason to 
expect earnings gap estimates to vary with cohort of arrival. We largely account for local and 
national macroeconomic conditions in the UK affecting earnings when we control for county 
and tax-year fixed effects. However, it is still possible that the earnings gap estimates are 
affected by immigrants' individual characteristics specific to their cohort of arrival. This is an 
identification issue that has played an important role in the immigration literature (Borjas 
1985  and  1999).  This  literature  has  long  recognized  that  a  sufficiently  large  and  long 
longitudinal data – a very scarce kind of dataset – is the ideal way to estimate such cohort 
effects  separately  from  assimilation  effects.  In  addition,  producing  estimates  by  cohort  of 
arrival is, of course, informative in itself. 
Thus, we now exploit the large and long nature of our longitudinal data to re-estimate 
Equation (2) including an explicit indicator for 13 five-year cohorts of arrival as a proxy for 
such "cohort" individual characteristics. This way we account for characteristics that vary 
across cohorts such as unmeasured dimensions of immigrants' skills or return migration of 
immigrants that are more or less able. Estimating the earnings gap in such a flexible manner 
across  cohorts  of  arrival  is  an  important  contribution  to  the  existing  UK  earnings  gap 
literature,  where  such  estimates  are  largely  unavailable.  This  is  in  contrast  with  the 
international literature, where considerable effort has been put into estimating such cohort 
effects (Borjas 1985 and 1999).
14  
The second column in Table 2 (and of its counterpart Table A3) shows significant cohort 
effect  estimates.  These  estimates  suggest  that  the  immigrant-native  earnings  gap  is  more 
negative for earlier cohorts of arrival. For example, immigrants that arrived in the post-war 
period  on  average  earned  55%  to  60%  less  than  comparable  natives  at  entry;  whereas 
immigrants that arrived respectively during the 1970s and 1980s and then during the mid 
1990s to the mid 2000s earned around 40% and 30% less than comparable natives at entry. 
This contrasts with estimates roughly between -15% to -35% for the US on a comparable 
model, which however uses the wage rate, instead of annual earnings, different controls and 
data from the 1970, 1980 and 1990 Census (Borjas 1995 Table 5 and Borjas 1999 Table 4). 
                                            
14 The available models in the UK literature do not control for cohort of arrival, except for Bell (1997), who 
includes an indicator for 4 ten-year-cohorts. Here we include an indicator for 13 five-year-cohorts for a sample 
period that is 15 years longer, which is a more flexible approach. 13 
 
Bell (1997) also estimated a comparable model for the UK using household survey data for 
the 1970s and 1980s, and found successively smaller cohort estimates for some groups of 
immigrants but not for others (see Footnote 14).  
The notable exception is those who arrived in the mid to late 1960s, whose earnings gap 
was smaller than those arriving two decades before or after. As discussed in Sections 2 and 3, 
this period witnessed relatively larger numbers of refugees from India, Kenya and Uganda, 
and the effect of this inflow on our estimates is not obvious. For example, if the individuals 
selected  into  our  sample  are  the  most  able  and  motivated  of  all  such  refugees  who 
immediately found work, our estimates might be less negative (see Section 3). Or if most such 
refugees are selected out of our sample because they did not immediately find work or were 
not allowed to work, our estimates might be less negative if such nationalities are typically 
lower earners. Since we do not observe entry route, we cannot determine whether the relative 
proportion of refugees increased or decreased from one cohort to another in our sample.
15  
Table  2  shows  that  the immigrant-native  earnings  gap  for  those  arriving  in  1945-1949 
narrows from -0.589 at entry to -0.418 after 10 years, to -0.175 after 20 years and to -0.015 
after 30 years. In contrast, the immigrant-native earnings gap for those arriving in 2000-2004 
narrows from -0.300 at entry to -0.129 after 10 years, to 0.114 after 20 years and to 0.274 after 
30 years. This suggests that immigrants arriving later not only have a smaller earnings gap at 
entry, but also have a faster earnings catch-up over time. While the convergence took over 30 
years for those entering in 1945-1949, it only took half as long for those entering in 2000-
2004. Incidentally, the convergence for the pooled sample was a little over 20 years, which is 
roughly the average between the earlier and later cohorts (see Section 5 and columns 1 and 2 
of Table 2). Figure 6 illustrates the earnings convergence over time for selected cohorts. 
 
5.2  Nationality Effects 
Our immigrant-native earnings gap estimates in Section 5.1 still pool together very diverse 
groups of immigrants who differ widely in several individual characteristics (such as English 
proficiency, work ethics, skills (formal education) transferability, etc.) and might not always 
be perfect labour substitutes. This is because all cohorts display a mix of nationalities, and 
                                            
15 For the single-year-cohort 2005, the gap estimate is more negative than that for the two previous cohorts. This 
could be due to relatively more low earners from A10 countries entering the sample, or it could be due to this 
cohort being four years shorter (this cohort constitutes a smaller sample than the other five-years cohorts, for 
which furthermore, there are at most two usable observations for each individual, as discussed in Section 2). This 
suggests that estimates for this cohort should be treated with caution.  14 
 
thus  very  different  immigrants  are  pooled  together  in  each  cohort.  We  thus  re-estimated 
Equation (2) including an explicit indicator for 8 continents of nationality as a proxy for such 
"group"  individual  characteristics.  Producing  estimates  by  continent  of  nationality  is,  of 
course,  informative  in  itself,  as  recognized  in  the  existing  UK  and  international  literature 
(Chiswick  1980;  Borjas  1994;  Butcher  and  DiNardo  2002;  Dustmann  and  Fabbri  2005; 
Dickens and McKnight 2008). In addition, estimates by continent of nationality can be loosely 
compared with estimates by cohort of arrival, since in most cohorts there are one or two 
dominant continents of nationality. Thus, a comparison between estimates by cohort of arrival 
and estimates by continent of nationality provides a further insight into the immigrant-native 
earnings gap phenomenon from a different angle.  
The third column in Table 2 (and of its counterpart Table A3) shows significant continent 
of nationality estimates. These estimates suggest that the immigrant-native earnings gap is 
more negative for non-white than for white immigrants. For example, non-white immigrants 
from Africa, Asia and the Middle East, and Central and South America earned around 50% 
less than comparable natives at entry; whereas white immigrants from Europe and the EU 
earned around 40% less, immigrants from Australasia and Oceania earned around 30% less, 
and immigrants from North America earned only 16% less than comparable natives at entry. 
Interestingly, the variation in the entry gap estimates across non-whites (51% to 52%) is much 
smaller than the variation in the entry gap estimates across whites (16% to 41%). The notable 
exception is white immigrants from the A10 countries, who earned around 50% less than 
comparable natives at entry.
16   
Table 2 shows that the immigrant-native earnings gap for Africans narrows from -0.511 at 
entry to -0.365 after 10 years, to -0.147 after 20 years and to -0.016 after 30 years. In contrast, 
the  immigrant-native  earnings  gap  for  North  Americans  narrows  from  -0.160  at  entry  to           
-0.014 after 10 years, to 0.204 after 20 years and to 0.335 after 30 years. This suggests that 
North Americans not only have a smaller earnings gap at entry, but also a faster earnings 
convergence. While Africans took over 30 years to catch up with natives' earnings, North 
Americans took just over 10 years. Incidentally, the convergence for the pooled sample was a 
little over 20 years, in line with the presence of proportionately more lower earners in the 
sample,  as  indicated  in  Figures  2  and  3  (see  Section  5).  Figure  7  illustrates  the  earnings 
                                            
16 As before, this could be due to relatively more low earners from the large inflow of A10 workers entering the 
sample in 2004 and 2005. As in the case of estimates by cohort of arrival, for many A10 workers there are at 
most two usable observations for each individual, which suggests that estimates for this nationality should be 
treated with caution.  15 
 
convergence over time for all continents. 
A comparison between these continent of nationality estimates and our earlier cohort of 
arrival  estimates  from  Section  5.1  suggests  that,  broadly  speaking,  the  immigrant-native 
earnings  gap  at  entry,  and  the  subsequent  catch-up,  is  less  negative  in  cohorts  with 
proportionately more white immigrants. This pattern is broadly true when comparing earlier 
post-war cohorts, which witnessed non-white immigration from former colonies, and more 
recent cohorts, which witnessed several waves of white post-EU enlargement immigration. 
This pattern is also true when comparing more recent cohorts, though the trend is less obvious 
and more subtle. For  example, this pattern can  be seen when  comparing the immediately 
adjacent cohorts of 1985-1994 and 1995-2004. In the 1985-1994 cohorts, when non-white 
immigration increased, the earnings gap at entry is -0.440 to -0.406 (though this period also 
coincides with greater white immigration following the enlargement of the EU in the mid 
1980s). In contrast, in the 1995-2004 cohorts, when white immigration increased, the earnings 
gap at entry is -0.305 to -0.300 (though this period also witnesses greater immigration from 
Asia  and  the  Middle  East  as  well  as  from  Africa).  Thus,  it  can  be  argued  that  the  entry 
earnings gap fell over time (except for the 1965-1974, as discussed in Section 5.1) but that 
this fall slowed and reversed in 1985-1994, when non-white immigration increased. Likewise, 
it  can  be  argued  that  the  entry  earnings  gap  fell  sharply  in  1995-2004,  when  white 
immigration increased. Bell (1997) estimated a comparable model using 1973-1992 UK GHS 
survey  data,  and  also  found  that  the  gap  at  entry,  and  the  subsequent  catch-up,  is  more 
negative for non-white immigrants (see Footnotes 2 and 14). Dustmann and Fabbri (2005) 
estimated a simpler model using data from the 1979-2004 UK LFS survey data and also found 
that the gap for non-white immigrants was more negative. 
 
5.3  Earnings Growth and Rate of Earnings Convergence 
Table 2 also shows the immigrant earnings growth rate and the immigrant-native earnings 
convergence rate over time in the pooled sample, by cohort of arrival and by continent of 
nationality. The first column in Table 2 shows that immigrant earnings growth in the pooled 
sample is 0.126 after 10 years. This suggests that newly arrived immigrants earn on average 
12.6% less than otherwise comparable immigrants that arrived 10 years earlier. Immigrant 
earnings growth is 0.233 after 20 years, 0.322 after 30 years, and 0.392 after 40 years. Thus 
earnings growth is fastest in the first 10 years, and is much slower after 30 years, when it 
tends to a plateau.  16 
 
The associated immigrant-native earnings convergence rate is 0.333 after 10 years. This 
suggests that the earnings of immigrants increase 33.3% faster than the earnings of natives in 
the first 10 years. The rate of earnings convergence is 0.573 after 20 years, 0.718 after 30 
years, and 0.770 after 40 years. Thus the rate of convergence is also fastest in the first 10 
years, and is much slower after 30 years, when it also tends to a plateau. 
The second column in Table 2 shows that immigrant earnings growth in the model where 
we control for cohort of arrival is larger than in the pooled model over time (0.176 versus 
0.126), though growth is still fastest in the first 10 years and much slower after 30 years. In 
contrast, the third column in Table 2 shows that immigrant earnings growth in the model 
where we control for continent of nationality is smaller than in the pooled model over time 
(0.112 versus 0.126), although, again, growth is still fastest in the first 10 years and much 
slower after 30 years. Therefore, the estimates of immigrant earnings growth rate are fairly 
robust across all three models, which is reassuring. 
The same is true for estimates of the rate of earnings convergence. They are fairly robust 
across all three models, although they are now smaller both in the cohort of arrival model 
(0.326  versus  0.333)  and  in  the  continent  of  nationality  model  (0.305  versus  0.333) 
(interestingly, they are larger after 30 and 40 years in the cohort of arrival model only). Like 
before, the earnings convergence rate is fastest in the first 10 years, and it is much slower after 
30 years. 
As no such estimates for the UK are available to compare our estimates with, we attempt a 
comparison  with  US  estimates,  despite  the  differences  in  the  labour  market  of  the  two 
countries and differences in the modelling approaches and sample data. Our estimates contrast 
with  an  immigrant  earnings  growth  rate  estimate  of  0.076  after  10  years  and  a  earnings 
convergence rate estimate of 0.060 after 10 years for the US on a comparable model, which 
however uses the wage rate, instead of annual earnings, and data from the 1970, 1980 and 
1990 Census (Borjas 1999 Table 4). Thus, both figures are smaller for the US, although the 
entry earnings gap was closer to our estimates in Section 5.1.  
 
6. Discussion 
We estimated the immigrant-native earnings gap at entry and over time for the UK between 
1978 and 2006. We initially utilized our long and large longitudinal data as a succession of 
independent cross-sections to estimate a simple descriptive immigrant-native earnings  gap 
model. However, because of concerns with bias implied by various types of selectivity in the 17 
 
data,  such  as  cohort  bias  and  survivor  bias,  we  re-estimated  our  simple  model  using  a 
restricted sample of immigrants who stayed in the UK for 30 years or longer. The pattern of 
both our unrestricted and restricted estimates was fairly similar, although the magnitude of the 
gap was consistently larger when using the restricted sample of tracked immigrants. Since 
other sources of data attrition are not much of a concern in our data, the obvious explanation 
here was return migration of the less able. The selectivity argument that more able, more 
motivated or more hardworking immigrants stayed on and were assimilated is in line with the 
larger more positive gap for the tracked sample. In other words, the unrestricted estimates 
were downwards biased and a comparison with the restricted estimates indicated the extent of 
such survivor bias.  
Nonetheless,  the  restricted  estimates  still  displayed  large  year-on-year  variation.  This 
suggested  the  presence  of  cohort  bias  to  some  extent  in  our  estimates,  perhaps  reflecting 
changes over time in unmeasured dimensions of immigrants' skills, probably associated, at 
least in part, with the different mix of immigrants arriving in each cohort. As our simple 
cross-section  unconditional  earnings  gap  cross-section  model  did  not  control  for  other 
individual characteristics that could proxy immigrants' skills, or for area or tax-year fixed 
effects, we then exploited the longitudinal nature of our data to estimate a more complete 
conditional earnings gap model to disentangle cohort and assimilation effects. 
Our estimates showed that the earnings gap at entry was relatively robust to controlling for 
other individual characteristics and area and time fixed effects. However, these extra controls 
did play  a marked role  in the estimates of the  immigrant-native  earnings  gap after entry, 
which was then less favourable. 
We drew two main conclusions from our longitudinal model estimates. Firstly, more recent 
cohorts fare better than earlier ones at entry. For example, immigrants that arrived in the post-
war period on average earned 55% to 60% less than comparable natives at entry; whereas 
immigrants that arrived during the 1970s and 1980s respectively and then during the mid 
1990s to the mid 2000s earned around 40% and 30% less than comparable natives at entry. 
This  contrasts  with  estimates  roughly  between  -15%  to  -35%  for  the  US  on  a  roughly 
comparable model (Borjas 1995 and 1999). 
Secondly,  the  earnings  of  immigrants  from  more  recent  cohorts  catch  up  faster  with 
natives' earnings. For example, the immigrant-native earnings gap for those arriving in 1945-
1949 narrows from -59% at entry to -42% after 10 years, and to -1.5% after 30 years. In 
contrast, the immigrant-native earnings gap for those arriving in 2000-2004 narrows from       18 
 
-30% at entry to -13% after 10 years, and to 27.5% after 30 years. While the convergence took 
over 30 years for those entering in 1945-1949, it only took half of as long for those entering in 
2000-2004. 
The  associated  immigrant  earnings  growth  rate  estimates  suggested  that  newly  arrived 
immigrants earn around 12.5% less than otherwise comparable immigrants that arrived 10 
years earlier and 32% less than those that arrived 30 years earlier. Thus, earnings growth is 
fastest in the first 10 years, and it considerably slows down after 30 years when it tends to a 
plateau. The associated immigrant-native earnings convergence rate estimates suggested that 
the earnings of immigrants increase 33% faster than the earnings of natives in the first 10 
years after arrival, and 72% faster in the first 30 years, when earnings convergence also slows 
down and tends to a plateau. This contrasts with an immigrant earnings growth rate estimate 
of 7.6% after 10 years and an earnings convergence rate estimate of 6% after 10 years for the 
US on a roughly comparable model (Borjas 1999).  
Both figures are smaller for the US, although the entry earnings gap was closer to our 
estimates, as discussed above. There are many reasons why our immigrant earnings growth 
rate  and  immigrant-native  earnings  convergence  rate  estimates  are  larger,  including 
differences in the labour market and in the immigrant population composition, as well as 
differences in model specification, data type and sample period. The US model uses the wage 
rate, instead of annual earnings, different controls and data from the 1970, 1980 and 1990 
Census. Other obvious differences include the fact that the US has had substantial non-white 
low skilled immigration whereas the UK has had comparatively larger white highly skilled 
immigration (Borjas 1994; Dustman and Glitz 2005). In addition, perhaps because the US 
labour market is more flexible, low paid immigrants in the UK have a more negative earnings 
gap at entry (see Section 5.1) and thus have faster earnings growth (Chiswick et al. 2008). 
Further, such low paid workers in the UK might be more skilled and hence might overcome 
the usual earnings and occupation downgrading they suffer at entry more quickly (Friedberg 
2001; Manacorda et al. 2006). 
 
7. Conclusion 
We exploit a large and long longitudinal dataset to estimate the immigrant-native earnings 
gap  at  entry  and  over  time  for  the  UK  between  1978  and  2006.  That  is,  we  attempt  to 
separately estimate cohort and assimilation effects for the UK for these three decades. We also 
estimate  the  associated  immigrant  earnings  growth  rate  and  immigrant-native  earnings 19 
 
convergence rate over time. 
Our estimates suggest that immigrants from more recent cohorts fare better than earlier 
ones at entry. For example, whereas immigrants that arrived in the post-war period earned 
nearly 60% less than comparable natives at entry, those arriving in the early 2000s earned 
only 30% less at entry. Furthermore, our estimates suggest that the earnings of immigrants 
from more recent cohorts catch up faster with natives' earnings. While the convergence took 
over 30 years for those entering in the post-war, it only took half as long for those entering in 
the early 2000s.  
Our estimates also suggest that newly arrived immigrants earn around 12.5% less than 
otherwise comparable immigrants that arrived 10 years earlier and 32% less than those that 
arrived  30  years  earlier.  Thus,  earnings  growth  is  fastest  in  the  first  10  years,  and  it 
considerably slows down after 30 years. Finally, our estimates suggest that the earnings of 
immigrants increase 33% faster than the earnings of natives in the first 10 years after arrival, 
and 72% faster in the first 30 years, when earnings convergence also slows down. 
These new results are an important contribution to the UK literature, where assimilation 
and cohort effect estimates are largely unavailable. This is in contrast with the international 
literature, where considerable effort has been put into estimating such effects. 
These new results are also an important contribution to the international literature, which 
has long recognized that a sufficiently large and long longitudinal data – a very scarce kind of 
dataset – is the ideal way to estimate cohort effects separately from assimilation effects. Thus 
by applying a thorough and careful approach in estimating these effects to one such a dataset, 
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Table 1 - DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS                                                            
VARIABLES LLMDB LLMDB LFS
April 1978 - Marc h 2007 April 1997 - Marc h 2007 January 1997 - Marc h 2007
Natives Immigrants Natives Immigrants Natives Immigrants
I - P OP ULATION VARIAB LES
% aged:
25 to 34 years old 31.34% 43.83% 29.47% 43.24% 29.06% 36.59%
35 to 64 years old 68.66% 56.17% 70.53% 56.76% 70.94% 63.41%
% of women 43.43% 44.85% 46.67% 44.37% 48.47% 47.51%
% from:
EU (except A1 0) - 32.20% - 30.99% - 25.66%
A10 - 4.03% - 5.41% - 5.43%
Europe (except EU) - 3.15% - 3.64% - 2.65%
Asia and Middle East - 20.89% - 22.38% - 27.94%
North America - 6.09% - 5.04% - 4.63%
Latin America - 3.24% - 3.49% - 6.59%
Africa - 13.80% - 16.16% - 21.39%
Australasia and Oceania - 7.30% - 6.39% - 4.74%
Unknown - 9.31% - 6.51% - na
Average age at arrival - 23.03 - 24.43 - na
Average nb of years since immigration - 14.73 - 13.30 - na
% with lenght of immigration
0 to 1 years - 8.64% - 11.15% - na
2 to 3 years - 10.17% - 12.54% - na
4 to 5 years - 8.48% - 9.73% - na
6 to 10 years - 16.96% - 17.06% - na
1 1 to 15 years - 15.24% - 14.02% - na
1 6 to 20 years - 11.70% - 10.46% - na
over 20 years - 28.82% - 25.04% - na
% arrived during:
1 945-1 949   - 3.87% - 0.04% - 1.03%
1 950-1 954   - 2.63% - 0.46% - 1.77%
1 955-1 959   - 4.54% - 1.69% - 3.45%
1 960-1 964   - 5.79% - 2.84% - 7.23%
1 965-1 969   - 6.05% - 3.38% - 8.57%
1 970-1 974   - 4.38% - 2.79% - 9.16%
1 975-1 979   - 17.45% - 11.77% - 7.61%
1 980-1 984   - 9.62% - 8.48% - 5.57%
1 985-1 989   - 12.72% - 13.47% - 7.69%
1 990-1 994   - 10.54% - 14.22% - 9.10%
1 995-1 999   - 10.59% - 18.95% - 13.49%
2000-2004   - 10.76% - 19.92% - 13.26%
2005 - 1.08% - 1.99% - 1.39%
% located in:
East Midlands 7.64% 4.26% 7.68% 4.28% 7.66% 4.79%
East of England 9.50% 7.28% 9.55% 7.62% 9.69% 9.12%
London 8.73% 29.87% 9.03% 35.14% 9.61% 41.76%
North East 4.46% 2.08% 4.35% 1.88% 4.32% 1.31%
North West 11.72% 5.54% 11.56% 5.57% 11.97% 5.57%
Northern Ireland 2.39% 1.26% 2.51% 1.29% 2.51% 1.22%
Scotland 9.43% 5.16% 9.39% 4.78% 9.03% 3.67%
South East 13.73% 12.37% 13.93% 12.87% 13.99% 13.87%
South West 8.79% 5.25% 8.76% 5.09% 8.51% 5.24%
Wales 4.87% 2.17% 4.79% 1.95% 4.87% 1.80%
West Midlands 9.16% 5.10% 9.10% 5.26% 9.20% 6.90%
Yorkshire and the Humber 8.68% 4.12% 8.66% 4.13% 8.66% 4.74%
















Table 1 - DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS (continued)                                                 
VARIABLES LLMDB LLMDB LFS
April 1978 - Marc h 2007 April 1997 - Marc h 2007 January 1997 - Marc h 2007
Natives Immigrants Natives Immigrants Natives Immigrants
II - LAB OUR MARKET VARIAB LES
% in work: 
1  to 25 weeks in the year 16.74% 26.05% 18.84% 30.33% na  na
26 to 50 weeks in the year 13.93% 18.96% 15.45% 20.95% na na
51  to 52 weeks in the year 69.09% 54.76% 65.55% 48.54% na na
Average number of employed weeks in the year 43.18 38.52 42.10 36.40 na na
Average number of unemployed weeks  1.37 1.39 1.03 1.17 na na
Average number of jobs in the year  1.33 1.53 1.44 1.66 na na
5th percentile of the log real earnings distribution 7.60 7.27 7.65 7.25 9.22 9.15
10th percentile of the log real earnings distribution 8.26 7.97 8.35 7.99 9.39 9.34
20th percentile of the log real earnings distribution 8.87 8.65 8.93 8.68 9.59 9.57
30th percentile of the log real earnings distribution 9.26 9.09 9.30 9.12 9.73 9.74
40th percentile of the log real earnings distribution 9.50 9.40 9.55 9.43 9.86 9.88
50th percentile of the log real earnings distribution 9.68 9.64 9.74 9.68 9.99 10.03
60th percentile of the log real earnings distribution 9.84 9.86 9.91 9.90 10.12 10.17
70th percentile of the log real earnings distribution 9.99 10.06 10.08 10.13 10.26 10.32
80th percentile of the log real earnings distribution 10.16 10.29 10.27 10.37 10.42 10.51
90th percentile of the log real earnings distribution 10.41 10.62 10.52 10.74 10.65 10.80
Average of the log real earnings distribution 9.48 9.45 9.55 9.50 10.00 10.04
Standard deviation of the log real earnings distribution 0.95 1.13 0.99 1.18 0.53 0.61
Number of observations 5053659 319427 1935699 172466 507606 42230
Number of individuals 387760 45309 277532 35415 na na
Average number of times an individual is observed 15.76 18.71 24.53 25.16 na na
% observations per year:
1978 2.89% 1.69% - - - -
1979 3.16% 2.02% - - - -
1980 3.07% 1.97% - - - -
1981 3.09% 1.96% - - - -
1982 3.08% 1.95% - - - -
1983 3.07% 1.95% - - - -
1984 3.14% 2.05% - - - -
1985 3.08% 2.03% - - - -
1986 3.11% 2.08% - - - -
1987 3.11% 2.14% - - - -
1988 3.26% 2.35% - - - -
1989 3.34% 2.52% - - - -
1990 3.42% 2.67% - - - -
1991 3.38% 2.74% - - - -
1992 3.42% 2.90% - - - -
1993 3.44% 3.02% - - - -
1994 3.50% 3.19% - - - -
1995 3.56% 3.32% - - - -
1996 3.56% 3.45% - - - -
1997 3.68% 3.67% 9.62% 6.80% 10.51% 9.23%
1998 3.73% 3.91% 9.75% 7.24% 11.55% 10.50%
1999 3.81% 4.30% 9.95% 7.96% 11.11% 10.15%
2000 3.86% 4.69% 10.08% 8.69% 10.56% 9.27%
2001 3.88% 5.00% 10.13% 9.26% 7.72% 7.30%
2002 3.88% 5.41% 10.13% 10.01% 10.14% 10.27%
2003 3.90% 5.91% 10.18% 10.94% 9.73% 9.86%
2004 3.83% 6.52% 9.99% 12.08% 9.23% 9.54%
2005 3.90% 7.43% 10.17% 13.75% 8.87% 10.23%
2006 3.83% 7.16% 10.00% 13.26% 8.44% 10.79%
Average number of observations per year 174264 11015 193570 17247 50761 4223
Source: Lifetime Labour Market Database and Labour Force Survey.
(1) Sample includes those aged 25 to 64 employed and earning between £100 and £1000000 in the year. 
(2) LFS figures are courtesy of the DWP.  23 
 
Table 2 - Earnings Gap, Earnings Growth and Earnings Convergence
Model estimate estimate estimate
Immigrant-Native Earnings Gap at Entry
Pooled -0.462
By Cohort of Arrival
1945-1949 arrivals  -0.589
1950-1954 arrivals  -0.547
1955-1959 arrivals  -0.540
1960-1964 arrivals  -0.487
1965-1969 arrivals  -0.367
1970-1974 arrivals  -0.390
1975-1979 arrivals  -0.417
1980-1984 arrivals  -0.409
1985-1989 arrivals  -0.406
1990-1994 arrivals  -0.440
1995-1999 arrivals  -0.305
2000-2004 arrivals  -0.300
2005 arrivals  -0.369
By Continent of Nationality
EU (except A10) -0.409
A10 -0.525
Europe (except EU) -0.388
Asia and Middle East -0.521
North America -0.160
Central and South America -0.521
Africa -0.511
Australasia and Oceania -0.314
Unknown -0.567
Immigrant-Native Earnings Gap After:
Chosen continent or cohort 1945-1949 North America
10 years -0.281 -0.418 -0.014
20 years -0.042 -0.175 0.204
30 years 0.104 -0.015 0.335
40 years 0.156 0.062 0.379
Chosen continent or cohort 2000-2004 Africa
10 years -0.129 -0.365
20 years 0.114 -0.147
30 years 0.274 -0.016
40 years 0.351 0.028
Immigrant Earnings Growth Rate After:
10 years 0.126 0.176 0.112
20 years 0.233 0.328 0.199
30 years 0.322 0.455 0.263
40 years 0.392 0.557 0.302
Immigrant-Native Earnings Convergence Rate After:
10 years 0.333 0.326 0.305
20 years 0.573 0.569 0.522
30 years 0.718 0.729 0.653
40 years 0.770 0.806 0.698








Table A1 - Immigrant-Native Earnings  Gap by Year
Tax-Year At Entry After 1 year After 10 years After 20 years After 30 years
coefficient s. errors coefficient s. errors coefficient s. errors coefficient s. errors coefficient s. errors coefficient s. errors
1978 -0.708 0.086 -0.459 0.081 -0.041 0.069 -0.090 0.089 0.017 0.062 -0.328 0.071
1979 -0.808 0.086 -0.467 0.078 -0.130 0.060 -0.157 0.102 0.030 0.058 -0.207 0.062
1980 -0.813 0.104 -0.466 0.096 -0.032 0.063 -0.079 0.078 0.031 0.057 -0.190 0.072
1981 -0.972 0.131 -0.555 0.096 0.061 0.081 -0.154 0.077 0.116 0.055 0.013 0.069
1982 -0.831 0.150 -0.429 0.128 -0.006 0.092 -0.046 0.125 0.138 0.066 0.062 0.079
1983 -1.168 0.129 -0.671 0.118 0.005 0.096 0.062 0.056 0.072 0.071 0.043 0.092
1984 -0.967 0.114 -0.502 0.095 -0.135 0.076 -0.049 0.028 0.237 0.070 0.059 0.076
1985 -0.798 0.097 -0.429 0.074 -0.023 0.081 0.091 0.034 0.293 0.065 0.108 0.073
1986 -0.690 0.089 -0.309 0.080 -0.202 0.065 0.120 0.040 0.230 0.067 0.134 0.064
1987 -0.930 0.083 -0.474 0.074 0.096 0.066 0.044 0.043 0.239 0.071 0.149 0.081
1988 -0.921 0.081 -0.549 0.070 -0.035 0.056 0.167 0.049 0.281 0.072 0.187 0.080
1989 -0.723 0.071 -0.512 0.064 -0.058 0.053 0.021 0.049 0.201 0.079 0.139 0.084
1990 -0.927 0.074 -0.590 0.064 -0.049 0.052 0.003 0.052 0.223 0.096 0.156 0.069
1991 -0.790 0.092 -0.408 0.078 -0.109 0.052 0.043 0.049 0.291 0.093 0.254 0.071
1992 -0.808 0.092 -0.626 0.071 -0.096 0.057 0.029 0.048 0.332 0.161 0.239 0.082
1993 -1.033 0.096 -0.514 0.076 -0.018 0.065 0.015 0.047 0.286 0.076 0.212 0.080
1994 -0.960 0.079 -0.608 0.061 -0.072 0.058 0.033 0.043 0.013 0.036 0.385 0.091
1995 -1.036 0.073 -0.640 0.062 -0.134 0.051 0.013 0.044 0.218 0.047 0.344 0.089
1996 -0.643 0.066 -0.286 0.059 -0.028 0.046 0.086 0.045 0.156 0.049 0.491 0.090
1997 -0.627 0.101 -0.353 0.085 0.062 0.052 0.014 0.044 0.140 0.052 0.224 0.084
1998 -0.924 0.061 -0.594 0.047 -0.103 0.061 0.016 0.039 0.210 0.058 0.544 0.093
1999 -0.972 0.055 -0.173 0.045 0.134 0.034 0.088 0.039 0.158 0.061 0.255 0.112
2000 -0.839 0.051 -0.112 0.041 0.133 0.032 0.134 0.042 0.117 0.059 0.270 0.081
2001 -0.807 0.051 -0.101 0.041 0.203 0.028 0.128 0.043 0.240 0.058 0.308 0.081
2002 -0.982 0.043 -0.192 0.035 0.150 0.028 0.157 0.041 0.155 0.056 0.352 0.161
2003 -1.027 0.037 -0.206 0.031 0.153 0.024 0.133 0.040 0.198 0.052 0.403 0.076
2004 -1.231 0.032 -0.392 0.026 0.020 0.024 0.170 0.038 0.141 0.051 0.091 0.040
2005 -1.135 0.028 -0.289 0.023 0.062 0.018 0.187 0.036 0.181 0.046 0.153 0.052
2006 0.000 0.000  -   -  0.096 0.020 0.135 0.037 0.120 0.051 0.217 0.056
Number of employed weeks No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of individuals
Natives 387760 387760 387760 387760 387760 387760
Immigrants 9949 9949 17625 11658 7060 4354
(1) The sample data used includes those aged 25 to 64 earning between £100 and £1000000 in any one tax year who are observed at least twice, hence, by construction, all those 
      entering in 2006 were dropped because they were only observed once (it excludes the self-employed). It includes immigrants arriving from 1945 onwards. See text for details.
(2) The number of immigrants in the year after entry is higher than the number in the entry year because the entry date is only recorded when the immigrant applies for a NINo, which 














Table A2 - Immigrant-Native Earnings  Gap by Year (tracked immigrants)
Year After 1 year After 10 years After 20 years After 30 years
coefficient s. errors coefficient s. errors coefficient s. errors coefficient s. errors
1978 0.081 0.149 0.238 0.097 0.175 0.078 -0.328 0.071
1979 - - 0.155 0.187 0.176 0.074 -0.207 0.062
1980 - - 0.135 0.121 0.225 0.076 -0.190 0.072
1981 - - -0.078 0.106 0.285 0.062 0.013 0.069
1982 - - -0.021 0.145 0.309 0.088 0.062 0.079
1983 - - 0.182 0.087 0.150 0.094 0.043 0.092
1984 - - 0.008 0.039 0.290 0.082 0.059 0.076
1985 - - 0.084 0.043 0.356 0.078 0.108 0.073
1986 - - 0.089 0.056 0.289 0.081 0.134 0.064
1987 - - - - 0.449 0.081 0.149 0.081
1988 - - - - 0.342 0.087 0.187 0.080
1989 - - - - 0.291 0.094 0.139 0.084
1990 - - - - 0.305 0.115 0.156 0.069
1991 - - - - 0.259 0.118 0.254 0.071
1992 - - - - 0.334 0.243 0.239 0.082
1993 - - - - 0.443 0.081 0.212 0.080
1994 - - - - 0.142 0.043 0.385 0.091
1995 - - - - 0.235 0.054 0.344 0.089
1996 - - - - 0.261 0.060 0.491 0.090
1997 - - - - - - 0.224 0.084
1998 - - - - - - 0.544 0.093
1999 - - - - - - 0.255 0.112
2000 - - - - - - 0.270 0.081
2001 - - - - - - 0.308 0.081
2002 - - - - - - 0.352 0.161
2003 - - - - - - 0.403 0.076
2004 - - - - - - 0.091 0.040
2005 - - - - - - 0.153 0.052
2006 - - - - - - 0.217 0.056
Number of employed weeks Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of individuals
Natives 146246 223960 314807 387760
Immigrants 179 2131 3659 4354











Table A3 - Earnings Regression
Variable coefficient s. errors coefficient s. errors coefficient s. errors
Intercept 6.062 0.013 6.067 0.013 6.040 0.013
Immigrant (=1) -0.462 0.051
1945-1949 arrivals  -0.589 0.053
1950-1954 arrivals  -0.547 0.056
1955-1959 arrivals  -0.540 0.056
1960-1964 arrivals  -0.487 0.055
1965-1969 arrivals  -0.367 0.054
1970-1974 arrivals  -0.390 0.054
1975-1979 arrivals  -0.417 0.052
1980-1984 arrivals  -0.409 0.053
1985-1989 arrivals  -0.406 0.053
1990-1994 arrivals  -0.440 0.052
1995-1999 arrivals  -0.305 0.053
2000-2004 arrivals  -0.300 0.054
2005 arrivals  -0.369 0.056
EU (except A10) -0.409 0.052
A10 -0.525 0.054
Europe (except EU) -0.388 0.056
Asia and Middle East -0.521 0.053
North America -0.160 0.054
Central and South America -0.521 0.055
Africa -0.511 0.054
Australasia and Oceania -0.314 0.053
Unknown -0.567 0.051
Years since immigration 0.014 0.001 0.019 0.001 0.012 0.001
Years since immigration squared 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Sex (male=1) x Immigrant (=1) -0.160 0.007 -0.164 0.007 -0.166 0.007
Age x Immigrant (=1) 0.024 0.003 0.018 0.003 0.022 0.003
Age squared x Immigrant (=1) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Number of employed weeks x Immigrant (=1) 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.000
Number of jobs x Immigrant (=1) -0.017 0.005 -0.020 0.005 -0.015 0.005
Sex (male=1) 0.604 0.002 0.604 0.002 0.604 0.002
Age  0.047 0.000 0.047 0.000 0.047 0.000
Age squared  -0.001 0.000 -0.001 0.000 -0.001 0.000
Number of employed weeks  0.040 0.000 0.040 0.000 0.040 0.000
Number of jobs  0.349 0.003 0.349 0.003 0.349 0.003
R-squared 0.49 0.49 0.50
Sample size 5366162 5366162 5366162
Number of individuals 433069 433069 433069
(1) The sample data used includes those aged 25 to 64 earning between £100 and £1000000 in any one tax year who are observed at least twice 
     (it excludes the self-employed). It includes immigrants arriving from 1945 onwards. See text for details.
(2) All models include area fixed effects (49 county dummies) and time fixed effects (29 tax-year dummies). See text for details.
(3) All models are corrected for intragroup correlation, as standard errors are assumed independent across groups of individuals but not within 













































































































































































Source: Lifetime Labour Market Database










































































































































































Source: Lifetime Labour Market Database
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Source: Lifetime Labour Market Database













































































Source: Estimates derived from coefficients in Table A1 (see text for details)
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Source: Estimates derived from coefficients in Table A2 (see text for details)



































Source: Estimates derived from coefficients in Table A3 (see text for details)
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Source: Estimates derived from coefficients in Table A3 (see text for details)
Figure 7 - Immigrant-Native Earnings Gap by Continent of Origin
 
 